

# COP30 Outcomes from the Global Mutirão: Implications for Africa's Climate Priorities

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## Overview

Africa is one of the world's most climate-vulnerable regions despite its minimal historical emissions. The region approached COP30 in Belém at a pivotal moment, coinciding with the 10th anniversary of the Paris Agreement. COP30 culminated in an outcome titled “*Global Mutirão: uniting humanity in a global mobilization against climate change,*” which served simultaneously as a symbolic call to regenerate multilateral political will and a practical “umbrella decision” integrating climate finance, adaptation, just transition, GST follow-up, NDC implementation, and related processes into a single strategic package. By bundling these strands, Mutirão sought to ensure that advances in one domain such as finance reinforces progress in others, bridging the persistent gap between rhetoric and implementation.

For Africa, COP30 reaffirmed its structural vulnerabilities while providing new leverage points to advance continental priorities. The conference underscored the urgency of formal recognition of Africa's special needs and circumstances, the continued deficit in climate finance for adaptation, loss and damage, and just transitions and the emerging opportunities under Article 6 carbon markets to generate predictable financing. It also exposed deep global divides on mitigation and energy transition, particularly over fossil fuel phase-out language, which leaves Africa navigating a balanced pathway that protects socio-economic

development while expanding clean energy systems.

On economic governance, COP30 reinforced non-discrimination principles applicable to climate-related trade measures, offering Africa a basis to challenge unilateral instruments that threaten industrialization and fiscal stability. Chronic undercapitalization of the Loss and Damage Fund remained a major concern, with African actors insisting on grant-based finance grounded in the polluter-pays principle.

Through the Mutirão framework, COP30 mobilized governments, the private sector, civil society, academia, and local authorities into a renewed collective effort to keep 1.5 °C within reach.

This paper synthesizes the main COP30 outcomes through an African lens, outlining how emerging decisions and processes can be leveraged to align climate action with development imperatives, safeguard economic space, accelerate resilience, and position Africa to shape global climate diplomacy ahead of COP31 in Turkey and COP32 in Ethiopia.

## A. Climate Finance Commitments (NCQG) and Article 9.1 Implementation

COP30 delivered key outcomes on climate finance, reflecting Africa's priorities for scaled-up and equitable support. The Belém outcome reaffirmed **Article 9.1 of the Paris Agreement: “developed country Parties shall provide financial resources to assist developing country Parties with respect to both mitigation and adaptation... and other Parties are encouraged to provide or continue to provide such support voluntarily.”** A two-year work programme was established to scrutinize Article 9.1 implementation, responding to African Group and G77+China calls for a formal space, though its scope was broadened to all of Article 9, diluting focus on developed-country obligations.

Further, Parties committed to mobilizing at least USD 1.3 trillion annually by 2035 for developing countries (“*Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T*”), prioritizing public and grant-based resources, especially for adaptation in vulnerable countries, LDCs, and SIDS. African stakeholders noted the target is non-binding, with no quotas, donor formulas, or safeguards against loan-heavy finance, and urged: exclusion of non-concessional loans, linking NCQG to debt cancellation and tax justice, and integrating Africa’s special needs and special circumstances (SNCs) into all finance decisions. Developed nations were urged to triple adaptation finance by 2035, building on the Glasgow pledge, a step hailed as “*genuine progress*.”

New pledges remained modest with \$128 billion for the Adaptation Fund (vs. \$300 billion target) and \$22 billion to the Loss and Damage Fund. African experts stressed predictable, grant-based finance is essential to implement climate plans, noting “*systemic inequities and barriers*” persist. Lord Nicholas Stern of the London School of Economics observed that the \$1.3 trillion roadmap is feasible but requires unprecedented cooperation. The two-year work programme is critical to translate Article 9.1 obligations and COP30 finance goals into actionable support that benefits African countries.

## B. Adaptation and the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA)

Adaptation remains central to Africa’s climate agenda, and COP30 marked a key milestone with outcomes on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA). Parties in Belém finalized the “*UAE Framework for Global Climate Resilience*” and adopted indicators to track progress toward the GGA’s eleven targets, providing a concrete basis for monitoring resilience. Observers noted that these Belém Adaptation Indicators will enable comprehensive coverage of adaptation in the next Global Stocktake. COP30 acknowledged the “significant challenges” developing countries face in accessing

finance for national adaptation plans (NAPs) and called for submission and implementation by 2030, stressing that “the cost of inaction would significantly outweigh the cost of timely and effective climate action.”

Support commitments were reinforced, including limited replenishment of the Loss and Damage Fund, the GEF, and the GCF. The Glasgow pledge to double adaptation finance by 2025 was reaffirmed, with a call to triple finance by 2035. African stakeholders welcomed the indicators but noted gaps, including access protections, even though delivery is not guaranteed, and absence of binding timelines. Non-state actors (NSAs) called for front-loading finance, transparent grant shares, and emphasis on locally led, gender-responsive, ecosystem-based adaptation. Persistent underfunding, including the Adaptation Fund’s \$300 billion target, underscores the gap between goals and actual support.

The Belém Adaptation Indicators established a framework to measure whether promised financial, technological, and capacity-building support translates into tangible resilience outcomes. COP30 solidified the global adaptation architecture, but implementation will determine whether commitments for Africa are met fully and on time.

## C. Just Transition and Critical Minerals Support for African Energy Transitions

The concept of a just transition, ensuring the shift to a low-carbon economy is fair and inclusive, gained renewed prominence at COP30, reflecting Africa’s priority to balance climate action with development needs. COP30 concluded the review of the Just Transition Work Programme (JTWP), strengthened the Programme’s foundations and integrated social dimensions, including social protection, decent work, and inclusion of vulnerable groups’ priorities championed by labour groups and many African nations. This focus

ensures the transition from fossil fuels considers poverty reduction, job creation, and energy access, critical for Africa, where 600 million people still lack electricity.

The headline outcome was the proposal to establish a Just Transition Mechanism, which, while not yet operational, will be developed by the UNFCCC Subsidiary Bodies to provide international cooperation, technical assistance, capacity-building, and knowledge sharing. Experts noted it as “a notable step forward in giving the programme a clearer institutional home.” African negotiators emphasized that JTWP must ensure “*transitions in our countries are supported and equitable*,” reflecting Africa’s low historical emissions and high sustainable development needs.

The final text was constrained by political compromises, with references to “transitioning away from fossil fuels,” critical minerals, and global supply chain reforms removed. African NSAs welcomed the principles but cautioned that without dedicated finance, social protections, and labour rights, the mechanism risks being declaratory. They called for a continental critical minerals’ governance framework anchored on local value addition, free, prior and informed consent, worker protections, and rejection of unilateral measures such as CBAM. While the JTWP remains cooperation-oriented, promoting best practices and capacity-building, COP30 affirmed the global shift to clean energy is “irreversible and is the trend of the future,” embedding justice and equity and positioning Africa to secure socially inclusive transitions, green jobs, and financial and technological support for renewable energy expansion.

#### D. Global Stocktake Outcomes and Implications for Africa

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<sup>1</sup> Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement

COP30, coming two years after the first Global Stocktake (GST1) at COP28, focused on translating its findings into action, a priority for African countries requiring accelerated ambition and support. The COP30 decision explicitly recognizes that the conclusion of the first global stocktake marks the end of the first Paris Agreement policy implementation cycle and resolves to accelerate implementation action, in direct response to GST1’s core message that current efforts are insufficient to meet the Paris goals, particularly keeping 1.5 °C within reach. For Africa, the GST underscored shortfalls in mitigation ambition, adaptation capacity, and finance mobilization that, if unaddressed, leave the continent highly exposed to climate risks.

COP30 established mechanisms to translate GST outcomes into action. The “UAE Dialogue” will implement GST results during mid-year UNFCCC sessions in 2026 and 2027, producing recommendations to accelerate action, share best practices, and guide countries and institutions in ramping up efforts. African negotiators emphasized that finance is the key enabler, insisting that GST1 findings be tied directly to means of implementation in NDC3.0 and future cycles. Complementary initiatives, such as the “Global Implementation Accelerator” under the CMA<sup>1</sup>, aim to support countries in implementing NDCs and NAPs along 1.5 °C pathways, providing technical and financial assistance, which is particularly critical for African states with plans on paper but limited capacity to execute them.

COP30 outcomes reaffirmed equity and common but differentiated responsibilities, noting that despite global progress (updated analyses showing projected warming at roughly 2.4 °C (assuming full implementation of current pledges) compared to pre-Paris projections of around 4 °C of warming

by 2100), efforts remain off-track for the 1.5 °C target and the window to act is “rapidly narrowing.” The decision highlighted that the risks and impacts of climate change will be much lower at 1.5 °C compared with 2 °C, reinforcing Africa’s call to limit warming. For African countries, these GST-driven COP30 outcomes offer a pathway to increased support, helping close the implementation gap through finance, technology transfer, and capacity-building by 2026.

### **E. Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and Africa’s Conditional Targets**

African countries have consistently submitted ambitious NDCs, with much of their mitigation and adaptation ambition conditioned on international support. COP30 acknowledged this dynamic. The CMA decision commended the 122 Parties that submitted new or updated NDCs and urged others to follow, noting that NDCs have become more comprehensive and now go beyond mitigation to voluntarily incorporate adaptation, finance, technology, capacity-building, voluntary cooperation, stakeholder engagement, response measures, just transition and loss and damage, reflecting GST outcomes. This evolution mirrors Africa’s approach, where NDCs integrate adaptation and clearly articulate support needs. Although COP30 avoided explicitly naming “conditional NDCs”, likely due to political sensitivities, it indirectly addressed them by affirming its commitment to accelerating implementation of nationally determined contributions in this critical decade, reflecting equity and CBDR, in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication. This reinforces that African countries must be supported to implement their NDCs without compromising development.

COP30 also invited Parties to develop implementation and investment plans for their NDCs, aligning climate action with development

strategies. These are precisely the plans African states have already prepared, often detailing the external finance required to achieve conditional mitigation scenarios, sometimes doubling ambition if tens of billions of dollars are provided. The emphasis on implementation therefore validates Africa’s conditional targets and places expectation on donors and institutions to fill these gaps.

High-level commentary around COP30 stressed urgency. Although 118 countries had submitted enhanced NDCs by November 2025, the world remains on a >2 °C pathway, meaning even greater effort is now needed to curb emissions and that the COP30 decision recognizes the need to limit the overshoot of 1.5 °C, which now seems inevitable (Lord Stern). For Africa, greater effort is inseparable from greater support, as most NDCs depend on finance and technology transfer. While COP30 did not create new legal obligations beyond reaffirming Article 9.1, it maintained political pressure. The Global Implementation Accelerator and related initiatives will prioritize assisting countries with conditional targets by matching investment to NDC needs.

With the next NDC cycle culminating at COP32 in Ethiopia, African leaders plan to use the intervening period to secure commitments ensuring that NDC3.0 is backed by finance. COP30’s finance outcomes, including the \$1.3 trillion roadmap and deliberations on the new goal, are therefore directly tied to NDC delivery. African negotiators ensured that ambition was formally linked to means of implementation, keeping equity and support at the center of future NDC enhancements and placing the onus on developed countries to enable full execution of Africa’s conditional promises.

### **F. Africa’s Special Needs and Circumstances**

Africa’s long-standing demand for formal recognition under the UNFCCC as a region with Special Needs and Circumstances (SNCs)—like

LDCs and SIDS—remains unresolved. Such recognition would acknowledge Africa’s unique vulnerabilities, including low historical emissions, disproportionate climate impacts and limited adaptive capacity, and could facilitate greater support and flexibility. At COP30, SNCs resurfaced in finance and implementation negotiations, though indirectly, and remained politically sensitive, with deliberations elevated to the Presidency due to divergent views. This again underscores the need for African unity going into COP31 and COP32.

In discussions on aligning financial flows with Article 2.1(c), the G77/China, including Africa, insisted that any future work must be grounded in the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and complement, rather than replace, Article 9 obligations. They also called for recognizing the special circumstances of LDCs and SIDS, but Africa was not explicitly mentioned. This omission reflects continued resistance to designating Africa as a special category, possibly linked to internal African diversity on emissions and resilience or the growing narrative of “Africa as a powerhouse of global climate solutions.”

COP30 maintained the status quo, offering no new designation of Africa’s special needs, which disappointed African negotiators who argue that Africa’s circumstances, including being home to most LDCs, extensive drought-prone regions and limited financial means, warrant explicit recognition. Nonetheless, African needs were implicitly addressed, as finance decisions emphasized grants and concessional finance for countries with significant capacity constraints, such as LDCs and SIDS. Lastly, the GGA indicators highlight Africa’s adaptation gaps, just transition and implementation initiatives are being shaped with regional contexts in mind.

COP30’s location in Belém and the forthcoming rotations to Turkey (COP31) and Ethiopia (COP32)

offer political momentum, as COP32 in Africa provides a platform to elevate SNCs again. African leaders, through the inaugural Africa Climate Summit Nairobi Declaration, called for such a recognition. While COP30 did not concede this, it kept equity and differentiated responsibilities central. Africa was mentioned symbolically in the preamble, although practical implications remain limited.

African Non-State Actors view the COP30 decision to open a two-year SNCs process as a strategic breakthrough after years of blockage but warn that SNCs risk dilution if subsumed under broad developing country framings. They stress that SNCs negotiations must explicitly link Africa’s climate vulnerability to structural economic disadvantages, including unsustainable debt, constrained fiscal space and unfair trade rules, which shape implementation capacity. For Africa, SNCs represent not only a technical designation but a political umbrella under which Africa should anchor future negotiations on finance, just transition, response measures and transparency to avoid symbolic outcomes and ensure transformative support.

## G. Carbon Markets and Article 6: Rules and African Participation

COP30 advanced refinement of the Paris Agreement’s carbon market mechanisms under Article 6, which present both opportunities and challenges for Africa. By 2025, the Article 6 rulebook was largely complete, but implementation issues required further clarification. Under Article 6.2 (cooperative approaches), Parties focused on transparency and environmental integrity after all initial reports reviewed showed inconsistencies in accounting for international transfers, raising concerns about the accuracy and integrity of these mechanisms. COP30 therefore launched a two-session work process to strengthen guidance and enhance capacity-building, which is an essential step for Africa, where participation in earlier

markets such as the CDM was limited by low technical capacity and few monetizable projects. African countries now seek to engage in Article 6.2 trading but require robust systems. COP30 acknowledged this by tasking the UNFCCC Secretariat with accelerating development of the Centralized Accounting and Reporting Platform and an international registry, while also addressing long-term support needs.

On Article 6.4 (the UN-supervised global carbon market mechanism), COP30 made a consequential decision on transitioning legacy CDM projects. Parties agreed to allow approximately 12,000 projects to transfer into the Article 6.4 system without reopening previously settled standards, but by adjusting the rulebook instead. This compromise responded to developing countries seeking continuity and preservation of investments, while opponents feared that grandfathering old projects could introduce credits of questionable additionality or quality. Observers warned that CDM-transitioned Article 6.4 emissions reductions are not compatible with the high integrity standards expected under the Paris Agreement. The decision nonetheless allows renewable energy, cookstove and reforestation projects in Africa to continue generating finance, even as integrity concerns persist. Importantly, attempts to politicize or weaken the Article 6.4 Supervisory Body were resisted, preserving the authority of the technical body, a crucial outcome for African countries that depend on strong international oversight due to limited domestic capacity to verify project quality.

Overall, COP30's Article 6 outcomes aim to make carbon markets more accessible, predictable and integrity-driven in ways that could expand African participation. Emphasis on capacity-building and technical infrastructure directly responds to African needs, and if implemented effectively, will help more African projects qualify under Article 6, contributing to global mitigation while attracting

climate finance. Beyond negotiations, initiatives such as the Carbon Market Coalition launched at COP30 offer additional platforms for African countries to develop domestic or regional carbon pricing systems. Africa's future engagement will depend on accessible technical support for reporting and accounting, and on equitable governance to ensure that African priorities shape evolving rules. COP30 helped protect these principles while recognizing Africa's support gaps, providing a foundation for more meaningful participation in global carbon markets.

## H. Mitigation, Fossil Fuel and Energy Access

Mitigation and fossil fuels were among the most divisive issues at COP30. Many climate-vulnerable states and observers demanded explicit fossil fuel phaseout language, citing scientific consensus that coal, oil, and gas must decline rapidly to keep 1.5 °C within reach. Major producers and some developing countries opposed such wording on grounds of energy security and development. The final texts therefore avoided explicit "phase-out" references. Instead, they underscored that the "global transition towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate-resilient development is irreversible," highlighted unprecedented renewable growth, and retained only softened references to fossil fuels. As noted in analyses of the JTWP decision, explicit references to transitioning away from fossil fuels were removed during negotiations, continuing a pattern from earlier COPs and falling short of strong global commitments.

For Africa, the implications are mixed. Many African countries support a global phasedown of fossil fuels contingent on adequate support, recognizing that climate impacts threaten development. Yet domestic planning across the continent still incorporates natural gas and other fossil resources to expand energy access and industrialize, consistent with the African Group's call for a "just and equitable" transition that does not constrain socio-economic advancement. The absence of

phaseout language preserves flexibility for countries such as Nigeria, Angola, Uganda, Kenya, Mozambique, and Namibia to utilize gas as a transition fuel to tackle chronic energy poverty. It also reflects the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, implying that wealthy, high-emitting nations should move fastest. African negotiators have repeatedly tied any agreement on fossil fuel reductions to guarantees of finance and technology transfer.

Global experts observed that despite the disagreements over an explicit plan for the transition away from fossil fuels, the Paris Agreement implicitly requires such a transition because its temperature goals cannot be met without replacing dirty energy with clean alternatives. This implicit requirement is significant for Africa as it affirms that although transition speeds may vary, the ultimate direction is fixed. COP30's Action Agenda reinforced this trajectory, with Colombia and the Netherlands announcing the first International Conference on the Just Transition Away from Fossil Fuels (2026), events that African countries can use to shape future global commitments on their own terms.

African NSAs viewed COP30 as a missed opportunity on mitigation. They stressed that Africa's development rights must be safeguarded, while global decarbonization must proceed with fairness, sequencing, and accountability for historical emissions. They also warned against carbon border adjustments, restrictive trade measures, and exploitative carbon markets that could suppress African industrialization. Many highlighted backsliding relative to COP28 and the heightened influence of fossil fuel lobbyists.

In place of direct fossil fuel commitments, COP30 doubled down on clean-energy momentum, welcoming significant progress on power grids for clean energy, electricity storage and energy efficiency, and reaffirmed calls to peak global emissions immediately and reach net-zero CO<sub>2</sub> by

mid-century, signals that imply a wind-down of unabated fossil fuels. For Africa, this cautious stance enables a balanced pathway that scales renewables, which are central to many African NDCs, while employing transitional fuels where needed for economic growth. Pressure, however, will intensify in future COPs for clearer commitments.

African leaders, through the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Africa Climate Summits, have articulated a vision of clean-energy-led growth and just transitions. COP30's cautious wording provides space to demand the significant finance and technology required to realize this vision. Without a firm global phaseout timeline, responsibility now shifts to individual countries and coalitions to drive the transition. Africa will use forums such as the upcoming just transition conferences and its COP32 presidency to ensure that any eventual global agreement on fossil fuel phaseout comes with a support package that protects Africa's development, eradicates energy poverty, and builds post-fossil economic opportunities.

#### H. Trade, Economic Governance and Response Measures

COP30 reaffirmed that climate-related trade measures must not constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade. African civil society emphasized that measures such as carbon border adjustment mechanisms, deforestation-free supply chain rules, and other unilateral standards risk shrinking Africa's fiscal space and undermining industrialization pathways.

African NSAs argue that Africa cannot finance adaptation, mitigation, or just transition efforts within a structurally unfair global economic system. They therefore link the trade agenda to climate justice, debt cancellation, tax justice, and fundamental reform of multilateral development

banks. COP30's language on non-discriminatory trade rules provides a legal foothold for contesting unilateral measures (carbon border levies, deforestation regulations). NSAs link climate justice to debt cancellation, tax justice, and reform of multilateral development banks. The language agreed at COP30 provides Africa with a legal entry point but not a remedy. Accordingly, African positions call for:

- Using COP30 language to challenge discriminatory unilateral trade measures.
- Embedding economic justice principles, including fair trade, debt workouts, and global tax rules into the SNCs, NCQG and response-measures work programmes.
- Strengthening alliances across climate, debt and trade justice coalitions to expand fiscal space for Africa to act on climate and development.

## I. Loss and Damage Fund

The chronic undercapitalization of the Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) was sharply criticized by multiple stakeholders. Developing countries' concern over the limited resources available to the Adaptation Fund and the FRLD reinforced the civil society critique of a widening finance gap. While the Barbados Implementation Modalities establish functional architecture, they fall short of equity expectations due to:

- Inadequate pledges (< USD 1 billion globally),
- Weak direct access for communities,
- Lack of automatic (polluter-pays) funding sources, and
- Risks that L&D support may veer towards loans or insurance mechanisms.

African NSAs called for ring-fenced, grant-only funding streams, including levies on shipping, aviation and fossil fuel profits.

African stakeholders conclude that COP30 was *not* the breakthrough the continent needed, but it has generated strategic entry points that must be leveraged through coordinated continental leadership. They stress that Africa must approach COP31 and COP32 with unified, time-bound demands in all work programmes (SNCs, Belém–Addis, NCQG, L&D, Just Transition). The priority shifts now to political strategy, implementation monitoring, and continent-wide mobilization.

African civil society provides a sharper political reading of COP30. While COP30 created openings such as the initiation of an SNCs process, the Belém–Addis adaptation track; the NCQG work programme; and a Just Transition Mechanism; African NSAs emphasize that these represent doors, not deliverables. They warn that COP30 failed to establish binding finance trajectories, avoided clarity on fossil-fuel phase-out, and left the FRLD severely undercapitalized, risking a continued gap between rhetoric and implementation. Africa's civil society networks therefore view COP30 as a moment to be claimed rather than celebrated, and a point of departure for political mobilization rather than a substantive shift in global climate justice.

This reading is reinforced by other observers of the COP30, who note that many of the COP decisions, although symbolically framed through the Global Mutirão, fell short of the urgency demanded by science and by vulnerable regions like Africa. Multiple constituencies (women, youth, environmental NGOs) expressed frustration over weak finance, slow adaptation ambition, and an absence of decisive commitments on fossil fuels phase-out.

## Conclusions